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The London Debt Agreement (LDA) eliminated half of West Germany’s external debt.
Subsequent years witnessed unprecedented economic growth. The LDA likely contribu-
ted to economic growth by creating ﬁscal space for public investment and social spend-
ing, restoring the full convertibility of the Deutsche Mark, and stabilising inﬂation. The
LDA was associated with a substantial and statistically signiﬁcant rise in real per capita
social expenditure relative to other spending categories. Synthetic control methods also
show that under the counterfactual of no debt relief, overall expenditure might have been
lower by  percent. The LDA also facilitated the reintegration of Germany into global
markets and full convertibility of the Deutsche Mark by catalysing accumulation of sufﬁ-
cient US-Dollar reserves.
. Introduction
In the aftermath of World War II (WW), West Germany experienced a historically
remarkable acceleration in the pace of economic growth. As shown in ﬁgure , in 
Germany’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was only  percent of the UK’s and
less than  percent of France’s. By , Germany had caught up with France and, by
, with the UK. This prolonged period of strong growth was not simply a short-term
rebound from the wartime devastation of infrastructure and enterprise. Almost all other
European nations embroiled in WW suffered initial economic setbacks from falling trade
and damage to reproducible asset stocks, demographic catastrophe, refugee movements,
and political upheaval, yet none had such a rapid and sustained growth as did West
Germany (Eichengreen ; Vonyó ). This growth—the highest rate in Europe—
came to be called “Wirtschaftwunder” or “The Miracle on the Rhine”, achieving a
 Unless otherwise stated, Germany refers to West Germany or the Federal Republic of Germany. West Germany
was the territory occupied by the US, the UK, and France from  until .
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compound annual growth rate of . percent in the s and virtually full employment by
the s.
There are many competing explanations for why West Germany fared so well
(Eichengreen ; Temin ; Eichengreen and Ritschl ; Vonyó , ). One
is that it simply returned to its long-term growth path after the war (Jánossy ). This
neo-classical post-war reconstruction/catch-up hypothesis, however, cannot account for the
divergence between Germany and other equally devastated western European nations.
Clearly, other policy and institutional factors must have played a role. A second common
explanation contends that the war created an opportunity to re-allocate employment from
low-productivity sectors like agriculture to high-productivity ones like manufacturing
(Temin ). Yet, in Germany increases in labour productivity owed more to changes in
the services sector than in manufacturing as the former absorbed most of the transfer of
employment from agriculture after WW (Broadberry ). A third explanation proposes
that growth arose from the formation of new trade partnerships in the late s and s
(Sachs and Warner ; Bordo, Eichengreen and Irwin ). Yet, during the s the
degree of openness of the economy, reﬂected by the sum of exports and imports as a share
of GDP, was actually lower in Germany (. percent) than in the UK (. percent),
Austria (. percent), and France (. percent) (Penn World Tables ). Others
emphasise the role of the end of Nazi state planning and subsequent introduction of free-
market reforms following US, UK, and French interventions (De Long and Eichengreen
; Eichengreen ). In this paper, we attempt to show how the debt relief program in
, known as the London Debt Agreement (LDA), might have partially contributed
indirectly to growth by creating a propitious economics environment as well as directly by
stabilising German public ﬁnances and allowing for greater public investment.
Current economic turmoil in Europe has led some scholars to revisit the experience of
West Germany’s debt relief (Piketty and Zucman ; Sachs ). In June , as part
of the Marshall Plan, the Western Allied powers began to negotiate a plan that would, in
Figure . Real GDP per capita in Germany and in Austria, Czechoslovakia, France,
and the UK, –.
Source: Data are from Maddison Project Database Update of .
Notes: Real GDP per capita is in  US$ with multiple benchmarks, so that account
has been taken for cross-country income comparisons.
 European Review of Economic History
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due course, eliminate half of Germany’s external debt and stipulate generous repayment
conditions for the remainder (for a review of the process see Abs ). The ﬁnal agree-
ment, called the LDA, was reached in London in .
The LDA resulted in the reduction of the total pre-war and post-war debts that Germany
owed from DM . billion to DM . billion (Deutsche Bundesbank Report May ,
–; Guinnane ), which, in nominal terms, Germany’s debts after WW nearly equal-
led its GDP for  (Ritschl ). The LDA also linked repayment of the remaining
debt to Germany’s economic growth and exports (so that the debt service/export revenue
ratio could not exceed  percent). There were also provisions for creditor countries to
renegotiate the terms of repayment if circumstances made debt service more onerous than
originally thought; ultimately, this was not necessary given Germany’s good ﬁnancial and
economic performance in the s and s (Guinnane ).
Could this debt relief help explain West Germany’s growth miracle? Several commenta-
tors support this view to varying degrees. Ritschl, for example, claims that, “West
Germany’s economic miracle, the stability of the deutschmark and the favourable state of
its public ﬁnances were all owed to this massive haircut” (Ritschl ). Other scholars sug-
gest it played a lesser, albeit important, role. Eichengreen and Ritschl argue that “The
German balance of payments beneﬁted from the country’s debts having been written down
by the currency reform of  and the London Agreement of ” (Eichengreen and
Ritschl , ). Similarly, Piketty and Zucman (, ) state that the debt relief, “…
help[ed] Germany move from a large net debtor position at the end of the war to a creditor
position by the middle of the s”. This view is also shared by Abs (, IX), the leader
of the German delegation at the London conferences, who argues that “thanks to the debt
arrangement, not only did the Federal Republic restore its international creditworthiness,
but the world also began to trust Germany once again” and by Adenauer (the German
Chancellor between  and ): “Without visible proof that the German creditor takes
seriously the fulﬁlment of its old obligations, the rest of the world’s trust in the German
economy cannot be re stored” (seen in Guinnane , ). Other commentators suggest
that debt relief enabled institutional reforms and inspired investor conﬁdence. According to
Sachs, “Germany’s new democracy needed the relief, and Germany needed a fresh start.
The London agreement played a major role in the economic recovery and construction of
Germany’s democratic institutions” (Sachs ). Guinnane views debt relief as a necessary
precondition for investment, and argues that “Settling the debt issue was not just a matter
of reckoning with Germany’s past—although that was necessary—but also of normalizing
economic relations with the rest of the world” (Guinnane , ).
To our knowledge, there is scant empirical evidence to address the validity of these
hypothesised beneﬁts. Virtually all economic history studies of the impact of the LDA have
been descriptive, covering the details of the meeting itself from personal experiences (Abs
) or with a narrative about the development of the conference and its agreements
(Glasemann ; Guinnane ). To our knowledge, there has yet to be an analysis of
the economic consequences of this debt relief even though, as several commentators have
argued, the lessons from the LDA may be relevant to Europe’s ongoing debt crises, in
Greece, among others (Kaiser ; Sachs ). Through our analysis, we will assess the
 There are alternative estimates, including those by Kaiser (), at  percent of  GDP. What is clear,
however, is that the reduction was substantial.
 Similar to our review of the literature, Guinnane () argues that “The London Debt Agreement has not
received as much attention from economic historians as one might expect”.
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extent to which this analogy applies and argue that such calls for simple replication of the
LDA are based on a misinterpretation of the events of  and their sequelae.
Here, we take advantage of a new dataset to investigate the impact of the LDA, extracted
from the ofﬁcial monthly reports of the Deutsche Bundesbank (the Central Bank of the
Federal Republic of Germany). These reports are available from August  until today
and provide an accurate picture of German economic activity and public opinion.
Moreover, from  to the early s, they contain numerous statistics and special issues
on the LDA, underlying the inherent interest in the state of German public ﬁnances and
public opinion of the debt cancellation. The rest of the paper is as follows: ﬁrst, we
review the context of the LDA and its place within the Marshall Plan and reconstruction
(Section ). Then, we outline the possible economic beneﬁts of the LDA, exploring three
potential mechanisms in which the LDA fuelled economic growth (Section ), and changed
the government’s budget constraint compared to a counterfactual with no debt relief. Using
differential effects and synthetic control analysis, we explore the extent to which the LDA
freed resources to invest, showing that in the wake of the LDA the budget constraint was
loosened for social spending such as that social spending and certain other categories grew
faster than they otherwise would have without debt relief. Then, using a DiD model with
bilateral trade with currency areas, we show that the LDA may have stabilised German
ﬁnances and promoted growth by helping fulﬁl the requirement of sufﬁcient US-dollar
reserves to restore full and credible convertibility which in turn was reﬂected in higher con-
ﬁdence in Germany in the international markets. Another major economic beneﬁt of the
improvement in the inter-temporal budget constraint that the LDA engendered was to sta-
bilise inﬂation and here too Germany compares favourably to other countries especially in
the years immediately following the LDA. In Section , we highlight the lessons that we
might learn from this historical episode.
. The context of the LDA
Before analysing the consequences of the LDA, it is ﬁrst crucial to contextualise it within
the wider Marshall Plan (–) and economic rehabilitation of West Germany.
Ofﬁcially termed the European Recovery Programme (ERP), the Marshall Plan was a mani-
festation of US interest in European reconstruction, aiming to foster long-term recovery
through a set of foreign aid and reform programmes. The ERP had economic and political
goals, including combatting and containing Communism and incentivizing market-based
economic activity. The Marshall Plan mobilised signiﬁcant sums of ﬁnancial aid to help
rebuild and stabilise Europe’s economies, amounting to a total of $ billion from  to
 (roughly $ billion at  prices or approximately  percent of the  US GDP
and about the same share of the collective GDP of the recipient countries; Eichengreen
). However, in monetary terms, the value of Marshall Plan aid to Germany was rela-
tively small ($. billion) compared with sums provided to the UK and France.
 Along with the Marshall Plan, the USA launched another recovery programme, the Government Aid and Relief in
Occupied Areas (GARIOA), with emergency aid to Japan, Germany, and Austria in the form of food to alleviate
starvation. This programme amounted to $, million between  and , which was more than what was ini-
tially projected under the Marshall Plan (Berger and Ritschl ). While not part of the LDA itself, in September
 Germany also concluded a restitution agreement with the State of Israel, with a payment of DM , million
in kind over twelve years to foreign individuals and the Jewish community. This amounted to roughly half of Israel’s
claim in the Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany (Dernburg ; Guinnane ).
 European Review of Economic History
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For Germany, the other key economic elements of reconstruction besides the Marshall
Plan involved three main structural reforms. First, the currency reform of  introduced
the DM, that converted most savings at a rate of . DM to  Reichsmarks and com-
pletely wiped out all domestic public debt (Lutz ; Piketty and Zucman ). Second,
the European Payments Union (–) liberalised and promoted capital ﬂows and
trade with a programme of short-term credit to member states that experienced balance-of-
payments difﬁculties (Buchheim ; Eichengreen ; Bordo b; Vonyó ). It
was only after these ﬁrst two measures had been adopted, in , that the third critical
element, the LDA, was ﬁnalised (Berger and Ritschl ; Guinnane ; Ritschl ).
The LDA was the most fragile element of the plan because it depended on the success of
the ﬁrst two. It was only undertaken once the USA, the UK, and France were satisﬁed that
these prerequisites were fulﬁlled that the macroeconomic beneﬁts of the LDA could begin.
Hence, since West Germany’s sovereign debt relief programme would not occur until
some years after the currency reform and the European Payments Union, the Marshall Plan
took account of this gap and explicitly blocked claims by creditor countries against
Germany until  (Dernburg ; Ritschl ). To do so, in  the USA asked reci-
pients of Marshall Plan aid to block claims against Germany until Germany had ﬁrst repaid
Marshall Plan aid (Dernburg ; Berger and Ritschl ; Ritschl ). Moreover, since
West Germany was occupied until  (although, in , with the creation of the Federal
Republic, the military governors were replaced by civilian high commissioners), the plans to
foster the restoration of sovereignty and restructuring the burden of debt were two sides of
the same coin (Guinnane ).
. Implementation of the LDA
The LDA aimed to establish a macroeconomic equilibrium in which the amount that
Germany would be required to pay would be linked to its ability to generate trade surpluses
and its annual export earnings (with payments limited to  percent of annual exports). In
other words, Germany would only pay down debt from its export growth. This would
ensure that debt relief was sustainable and avoid problems which bedevilled Germany fol-
lowing the Treaty of Versailles (Keynes ). There were also provisions for creditor
countries to renegotiate the terms of repayment if circumstances made debt service more
onerous than originally thought.
At the time, critics expressed doubt that the LDA could actually solve such problems, as
even though Germany had been running large surpluses with the European Payments
Union area since , no one could anticipate the “Wirtschaftwunder” and if surpluses
were likely to persist, or if they would level off at a moderate amount (Dernburg ;
; Abs ). Clauses for renegotiating terms also could create a “moral hazard”, as
such ﬂexibility might encourage a German successor government to ﬂout their international
obligations, such as by “gaming” conditions so to avoid debt repayment (Dernburg ;
Guinnane ). Critics further argued that the plan could perversely encourage risky
ﬁnancial behaviour in the future (yet another manifestation of moral hazard this time by
lenders), so increasing the risk of future debt repayment problems.
 The currency reform also involved a comprehensive set of changes to wages, prices, and banking reform. See
Lutz () for the details.
 Another reason why the LDA was delayed until  is that the LDA could not occur until the US emergency
plans ended. For example, the GARIOA only ended in .
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The LDA responded to concerns about moral hazard by incorporating Germany into the
multilateral negotiations with private and public creditors creating a realistic repayment
scheme. The LDA minimised the incentives for creditors to lend without evaluating the
risk of the new loans, as the creditors assumed part of the losses if Germany was unable to
pay. Hence, both parties shared the costs of hazardous or risky behaviour. It was also
unlikely that other highly-indebted countries would seek a similar write-off of debt;
Germany occupied a unique position as the only country in Europe expecting help because
of its importance to a wider European recovery after WW and, politically, to counteract
threats in the Cold War. Regarding solvency of private debtors, the LDA also enacted
supervision through the German courts. For instance, The Economist announced that: “The
international agreement, under which the Federal German Republic formally accepts
responsibility for Germany’s prewar external debts, was signed in London last week by the
representatives of nineteen countries… If any debtor refuses settlement along the lines laid
down in the agreement, the German Government is to afford the creditors concerned the
right to have the terms of the settlement established through German courts” (The
Economist  March , ).
It was also pointed out that the LDA forced West Germany to accept responsibilities for
debts issued by political entities that no longer existed (such as Prussian states) and that
West Germany was also paying some of the debts for the German Democratic Republic
(East Germany). Critics further questioned the calculations of the total amount owed (e.g.,
the depreciation of the different currencies in which debt was owed altered the real amount
of repayment and the calculation of the back interest; Abs ). Furthermore, Abs ()
stresses that the negotiations were complicated at different points given the Allies’ diverse
objectives. For instance, the USA’s initial plan was simply to forgive all debt that arose out
of assistance after WW (Abs , ). Differences also appear between private creditors
and their governments, though the premise was to demand from Germany only what it
could afford. Rombeck-Jaschinski () also stresses difﬁculties between private creditors,
creditor governments and Germany. Indeed, the Bundestag at ﬁrst refused to ratify the
agreement in .
Nonetheless, despite these and other problems, Dernburg (, ) describes how the
press, when the agreement was signed in , viewed the conditions agreed to by
Germany as much better for Germany and creditors than had been anticipated during the
negotiations in  and . International attention came from The Economist, The Statist,
The New York Times, or the London Times, that viewed the relief as generous as circum-
stances allowed, meeting the willingness of Germany to restore its credit and with a clear
success to anticipate problems during the negotiations. For instance, in the summer of
, The Economist commented that: “The agreed terms promise a more satisfactory settle-
ment than many observers of the London Conference had expected. Until quite recently,
these discussions had been viewed with caution, and even scepticism, owing to the
immense complexity of the problem, to the ominous start given to the discussions by
Germany’s ﬁrst and derisory offer, and to the subsequent development of deep differences
of views between various national groups of creditors… If agreement could none the less be
reached, it was due to a spirit of co-operation and conciliation that very few expected to
ﬁnd at a conference of this kind” (The Economist; August  , ). Yet, there is also
a sense that the US press was biased towards a business story, focusing largely on the impli-
cations for US private creditors. The West German newspapers on the other hand viewed
the agreement as a fresh start for Germany and anything better than to continue in isolation
 European Review of Economic History
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(Guinnane , ). More critically, however, were the East German newspapers that
viewed the agreement as a deal among war criminals and something cooked in Wall Street.
The LDA eliminated half of Germany’s external debt and stipulated generous repayment
conditions for the remainder according to its export growth. This was attributed by some
commentators to the strong desire on the side of Germany to restore its credit and to show
that Bonn was not Weimar (Feldman ).
. Debt repayment under the LDA
Debt repayment rapidly began after the conclusion of the LDA and was discussed recur-
rently in the monthly reports of the Deutsche Bundesbank: “From the coming into force
of the various LDAs in August  until September  no less than DM . billion…
had been paid in the form of ordinary and premature redemption and repayment of the
pre-war and post-war debts settled in London” (Report November , ). According to
the different ﬁgures reported by the Deutsche Bundesbank, by , . percent of the ori-
ginal debt was already serviced, . percent in , . percent in , . percent in
, and . percent in , and by the end of the s more than three-quarters of
the original debt had been settled. What was left was repaid in subsequent years.
Importantly, since Germany had systematically defaulted on most of its foreign loans
since the early years of the Nazi-era, the LDA did not actually reduce payments on debt
compared with pre- years; Germany had not made any payments prior to  for over
two decades. Rather, the LDA reduced debt repayments relative to a counterfactual scen-
ario in which Germany would have been forced to restart servicing its total pre-war debt
on a much less favourable basis. As already seen, the LDA was the key element of the
Allied forces and Atlantic community’s plan to integrate Germany into the Western econ-
omy and, in the European context, the low levels of debt owed by Germany compared to
its high indebted neighbours, left Germany in a very favourable position.
In addition, there were also opportunities to redeem or repatriate debts more rapidly
through early repayments. According to the German economists working at the Deutsche
Bundesbank: “anticipated repayment of external debts may be expedient and useful, and
that at least in part it may contribute towards relieving the existing balance of payments ten-
sions in Europe. That is why the German authorities have already for some time been prac-
tising and promoting the anticipated repayment of external debts within the limit of what is
possible” (Report November , ). Hence, despite the fact that debts settled under the
LDA formed the largest part of Germany’s total external indebtedness, it was possible to
take over the payments of debt according to the development of German ﬁnances and in
connection with its balance of payments.
 While some authors claim that for the period – only interest payments were due, giving breathing room
for Germany to grow (Guinnane , –), others observed that repayments under the LDA began in 
and not in  (Tooze ). The correct answer is that while some agreements (especially with the USA)
enjoyed a grace period and began effectively in , some others, such as the post-war aid with the UK,
France, or the STEG Agreement, did not. As reported by the Deutsche Bundesbank: “The contractual repay-
ment of the liabilities ﬁxed in London in respect to post-war economic aid began in relation to the United
Kingdom and France as early as . On the contrary, the contractual repayment to the United States started
only in ” (Deutsche Bundesbank , ).
 According to the Deutsche Bundesbank Report of March  (page ): “within a decade the debt has been
reduced, through redemption according to plan, premature repayments and the repatriation of external bonds,
to about one-sixth of its original amount”.
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. The economic beneﬁts of the LDA
Did the LDA contribute to West Germany’s subsequent growth? If so, how? Ritschl ()
argues that “after the First World War and again after the Second World War, Germany
was the world’s largest debtor, and in both cases owed its economic recovery to large-scale
debt relief”. Reinhart and Trebesch () have recently examined the aftermath of debt
relief in  countries between  and ,  and  and ﬁnd that the economic
situation of debtor countries improves signiﬁcantly after debt relief, but only if these contain
debt write-offs. They calculated that, on average, write-offs on the magnitude of –
percent during the interwar period led to increases in GDP of – percent during the
 years following the debt cancellation. However, while Reinhart and Trebesch () look
at the impact of debt restructuring during the interwar period and in recent decades, they
do not look at what happened after WW, thus excluding the LDA.
Debt relief can fuel growth in several ways. Figure  summarises the three potential
mechanisms. The most obvious economic beneﬁt is the extent to which debt relief reduces
debt repayments relative to a counterfactual scenario and relative to other nations, thus
freeing up resources to invest and loosening the inter-temporal budget constraint of a gov-
ernment (Krugman ). Second, the LDA also provided stability to German ﬁnances
after decades of political and economic instability, thus reducing the likelihood of a new
default and waterprooﬁng ﬁnancial stability (Reinhart, Reinhart and Rogoff ; Reinhart
and Trebesch ). By improving the balance of payments, the return to convertibility was
promoted. Thus, the LDA improved conﬁdence in Germany of international capital mar-
kets and facilitated re-integration into the global ﬁnancial system. Finally, debt relief also
brought an inﬂation stabilising component to the German economy (Piketty and Zucman
). We consider each of these mechanisms in turn.
. Beneﬁt : creating ﬁscal space for investment
One of the principal intended economic beneﬁts of the LDA was reducing total debt rela-
tive to the original amounts owed, and which would eventually have had to be re-paid or
defaulted on outright. The negotiated debt reduction of LDA freed up ﬁscal space relative
to a situation where Germany re-commenced re-payment on total accumulated claims.
This space could then be used for domestic investment and to satisfy pent-up demand for
social expenditure after the initial emergency plans of the Marshall Plan (Eichengreen and
Ritschl ; Guinnane ; Vonyó ). Although the design of the LDA tied
Figure . Conceptual framework.
 European Review of Economic History
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/ereh/article-abstract/23/1/1/4995332 by London School of H
ygiene & Tropical M
edicine user on 15 April 2019
repayment to trade surpluses, during the s the amounts owed under the LDA were still
a substantial burden for German ﬁnances (Glasemann ; Ritschl ). Therefore, in a
counterfactual scenario of doubling debt repayment, it is hard to imagine how Germany
could have serviced its debt without ﬁscal struggle. During the s and the ﬁrst half of
the s, Germany did not contract any signiﬁcant foreign debts until the DM revalued
within the Bretton Woods system in March  (Report April , ).
Allied powers were also concerned about problems in attaining domestic investment
goals if large repayments were demanded. Early in the negotiations, under the Committee for
Fundamental Questions, Abs highlighted three factors where large repayments would exert a
negative inﬂuence in the long-term. First he listed the expropriation of foreign assets.
Second, the sustainability of social expenditure, and third the supply of raw materials and
the investments for the reconstruction of basic infrastructure (Abs ; Rombeck-
Jaschinski , –). Regarding the problems of balancing the budget, Abs was also
worried that the post-war situation could only worsen the burden of the public budget and
made the case that given the inﬂux of low skilled migrants and refugees coming from East
Germany and unemployment, “an additional burden on the state budget could be expected
through additional social spending” (seen in Rombeck-Jaschinski , ).
The LDA mostly prioritised spending on social welfare because other spending was
rather limited or blocked. For instance, since West Germany was an occupied territory, it
did not have armed forces on its own until , and the building up of potent national
defence took many years even after the start of rearmament (Vonyó , ). Spending
on trade to promote exports was also limited as this mechanism followed the EPU system.
These new funds were also not used for emergency relief, because the Marshall Plan and
the aid programme under the Government Aid Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA), which
ended, respectively in  and , were the main elements of the Marshall Plan to pro-
vide relief assistance (mostly on food, fuel, and medical supplies) along with social invest-
ment (De Long and Eichengreen ; Dernburg ; Guinnane ).
Social spending, on the other hand, rapidly increased with the ratiﬁcation of the LDA. For
instance, on housing Vonyó (, ) notes that “Social housing was not only one of the
most activist instruments of public policy in post-war Germany, [but] it also created legacies
that persist even today”. Stolper and Roskamp (, ) also show that social spending
was mostly exogenous to the business cycle: “Investment in residential construction was
largely independent of market forces; as a social necessity it was pushed as much as available
resources permitted”. Indeed, there is historical evidence that social spending was intention-
ally “blocked” prior to the LDA. Finance Minister Schäffer speciﬁcally sought to reform the
social system, but waited for debt settlement. He made the case that social services ﬁnanced
by federal funds were contingent to debt repayment (Hockerts , ; Schwarz , ).
Fiscal policy was also tied to the political agenda with federal elections coming in
September of . In his campaign, Adenauer promised large increases on social spending
for a new social era. For instance, during the spring of  The Economist commented that
Adenauer’s “programme called for, although not in very speciﬁc terms, an improved system
of social welfare that would look after the young and all the millions who have suffered
from the effects of the war” (The Economist;  May , ). Not surprisingly, coincid-
ing with the signature of the LDA, in February of , The Economist noted that “a whole
series of increases in social welfare payments has been added to the already very heavy
German burden” (The Economist;  February , ). Similarly, also in  The New
York Times informed that “Reports from well-informed sources in Germany strengthen the
belief that at the general elections in Germany on Sept. , Chancellor Konrad Adenauer
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will be returned to power. One immediate result would be re-creation of an efﬁcient capital
market in Germany to enable all existing capital reserves to be mobilized for constructive
use” (The New York Times; August  , ). Leaman (, ) also argues that new
funds for social investment followed the elections of .
Hence, during the s, the most important category of expenditure was that of social
welfare (. percent). This was followed by investment in defence, law and order (.
percent), education (. percent), housing (. percent), economic development (. per-
cent), and health (. percent) (Weitzel ).
The Reports of the Deutsche Bundesbank also show evidence of hedging against a worse
counterfactual. For example,  years after signing the LDA and when most debts were
repaid, the German ofﬁcials still highlight that “Interest payments under the LDAs, which
for a long time had determined the course of net investment income, were of only subordin-
ate importance in  because such debts had been largely repaid” (Report of January
, –). The Report of January  (p. ) also discusses that “the position on
investment income greatly improved by comparison with the previous year… This was due
to an increase by more than DM  million in the receipts, chieﬂy comprising interest
received by the Bundesbank, while income payment to foreigners remained practically
unchanged. One reason why the outgoings to foreign countries did not rise in view of the
large capital imports which the Federal Republic recorded in  was that, because of the
steady decline in outstanding indebtedness, the interest payments under the London Debt
Agreements are continuously decreasing” (see also the Report of April , ).
In discussing whether the debt written down in the LDA freed resources to invest,
Eichengreen and Ritschl (, ) opine that “what really seems to have mattered for
Germany’s ﬁscal system was the absence of large interest burdens on the public budget that
allowed Germany to keep tax rates low and insulated the public budget from balance-of-
payments pressures”. Similarly, Guinnane (, –) comments that “The London
Debt Agreement represented a pragmatic understanding of Germany’s potential role in
Western Europe’s economic and security system” and that “The London Agreement had
one immediate effect: private investment in Germany resumed” (Guinnane , ).
Andic and Veverka (, ) also discuss low debt burdens relieved social spending: “the
secular growth of the public sector… lies not only in the relatively low levels of defence
expenditure but also in the almost complete absence of national debt” and Vonyó pushes
the idea that “social policy rather than economic policy made the most critical contribution
to West German growth miracle” (Vonyó , ).
These arguments about relaxing binding constraints for new welfare spending are not
entirely new. Sachs has long argued that prior to debt relief debt servicing was often priori-
tised over social spending in Highly-Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). For him, the “cap-
acity to pay must be judged according to the alternative uses of funds claimed by debt
servicing… If the resources were freed up and successfully redirected towards basic human
needs, there could be signiﬁcant improvements in human welfare… For many of the
HIPCs, by contrast, the most basic human needs are jeopardized by the continuation of
contractual debt servicing” (Sachs , ). Indeed, Sachs makes the particular case that
debt relief, rather than trade surpluses, account for new domestic spending: “The export-
based ratios are irrelevant to capacity to pay (the governments do not own the export reven-
ues; nor does a debt-to-export ratio address the tradeoffs between debt servicing and social
spending). The new debt-to-government revenue target is an improvement, but is numeric-
ally arbitrary and offers no way to assess the tradeoffs between urgent social spending and
debt servicing” (Sachs , ).
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We next explore whether in the wake of debt relief the budget constraint was loosened
for social spending such that social spending and certain other categories could now grow
faster than they otherwise would have without debt relief. Obviously, in any treatment-
control design the counterfactual is an assumption and untestable (e.g., the debt relief also
affected non-social spending) and levels of impoverishment in post-WW Germany were
lower than today’s HIPCs (Guinnane ), but commentary by Abs during the negotia-
tions, contemporary observations and work on HIPC debt relief make parallel trends (i.e.,
that social spending would not have grown relatively quickly in the absence of an LDA
agreement) very plausible.
We use the data from Weitzel () originally collected from the German ﬁnancial ofﬁce
(Statistik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland). These data refer to the entire government budget
rather than central expenditure alone and report nominal expenditure in  groups that we
regrouped into  meaningful categories. For instance, the category “education” consists of
primary education, secondary and tertiary education, while “health” includes health services,
social and healthcare expenditure and other social services. It seems that data on the semi-
public social insurance system are included under the healthcare system. To the best of our
knowledge, Weitzel possesses the only dataset with budget expenditure data going back to
 with yearly data for different spending categories and, as he comments, despite the lim-
itations of the functional organisation of the Imperial period, after World War  the German
ﬁnancial statistics were prepared using almost unchanged principles (Weitzel , ).
The LDA not only affected the budget from the central government, but also alleviated
regional budgets (made by states and local authorities) (Guinnane , –). For
instance, throughout the s and s, German states and regional units (municipalities
and cities) had considerable ﬁscal autonomy with rights to ﬂoat loans abroad and in
Germany and quickly increased their external debt position (James ). As the legal suc-
cessor of the German Reich, West Germany recognised its responsibility for the state debt
despite avoiding municipal obligations issued by cities that were located in East Germany
(Article  of the LDA Treaty). According to Guinnane (, ), “it would have been
perverse to force the citizens of West Germany to repay debts incurred by Dresden or
Leipzig.” Yet, by March , debt from what later become East Germany amounted to a
maximum of , million of DM (this ﬁgure might be lower as the Treaty excluded cities
in the former state of Prussia) compared to a total debt of , million of DM of what lat-
ter become West Germany. Debt owed by states was even smaller (in total by March
, this amounted to DM  million). Further burden was placed on West Germany
due to the assumption of debt incurred by the Austrian government during the Anschluss
(the annexation of Austria into Germany on March ) (Guinnane , ).
To explore the impact of the LDA and the new funds associated with the debt relief on
German ﬁnances, we use differential effects that explains variations in  different types of
expenditure in the budget, using as a dependent variable the level of expenditure (in marks)
 Data are available in Weitzel (, Tab. c) under “functional breakdown of public expenditure” (–)
and also in gesis (http://www.gesis.org/). Weitzel reports a full Appendix showing the detailed sources that were
used (Statistisches Quellenverzeichnis).
 Weitzel stresses that great attention was taken to avoid double counting in issues related to the social insurance
between the different levels of government.
 To estimate the municipal amounts owed in  for what later become East Germany, we added the data from
Anhalt, Berlin, Brandenburg, Sachsen, Thüringen, Mecklenberg-Strelitz, and Mecklenberg-Swerin. Municipal
and state level data are from the Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich (, Table : –).
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per capita adjusted for inﬂation. In the treatment group, we include four social spending
budgets and in the control group non-social spending. Speciﬁcally, we run the following
regression:
∑α β ε= + ( ) ⋅ + + + ( )
=
y social Post Post social 1
s
s s t t sct 0
1
4
ct
where yct is real expenditure per capita for spending category c, social is an indicator equal
to one for four social spending categories (economic development, education, health, and
housing), Post is an indicator equal to one from  until  and ε is an error term.
We hypothesise that social expenditure will grow relative to the other ten categories from
 following implementation of the LDA. We use the data from Weitzel (), and
aggregate the budget expenditure into fourteen consistent categories for the period
–. The post-treatment period begins in , so the indicator Post equals zero
for the years – and one otherwise. Additionally, we explore where the treatment
group is social expenditure, which groups the spending categories of health, education, eco-
nomic development, and housing. The control group contains the remaining  categories.
We investigate the issue of parallel pre-trends graphically in Figure A of the Appendix.
This ﬁgure shows that while spending in social and non-social categories was about the
same in  and grew at roughly the same speed as other categories between  and
, after  spending in social categories grew much faster than spending in non-social
categories.
We take into account potential developments that might be responsible for the faster
growth of social spending around the time of the LDA. In particular, we consider the role
of the Lastenausgleich (an equalisation of war losses), which came into force on  August,
 and was an important tax on assets, the revenue from this tax was earmarked for social
spending on refugees and war-damaged ﬁrms and individuals (Strecke ). However,
according to the classiﬁcation made by Weitzel (), these funds are allocated and sub-
sumed in the budget for Defence and Special Warfare (Verteidigung und besondere
Kriegsfolgelasten), and therefore are not in our treatment group (Weitzel , Tab. c).
A ﬁrst version of the Lastenausgleich, the Soforthilfegesetz, was implemented on  August,
 long before when it could have affected the impact of the LDA in our models. If these
policies were driving any growth in social spending our results should be biased towards
zero given the category into which this spending is classiﬁed.
 These are: administration of justice, agriculture, church and culture, defence, economic development, educa-
tion, ﬁnancial management, health, housing, internal administration, public safety and order, regional and com-
munity spending, trade and commerce, and war burdens. We aggregate some of the categories initially proposed
by Weitzel () and for example, primary, secondary and higher education were collapsed in a single category,
education.
 Weitzel comments that “After the defeat of the Nazi regime … the war burdens increased. In particular war-
related social needs… In the ﬁrst few years of the Federal Republic, in particular, the “military policing expendi-
tures”, as well as the services of the LAG [LAG stands for Lastenausgleich], fund for agriculture, industry and
housing construction are of paramount importance” (pp. –). He further comments that he ascribes the
Lastenausgleich and social war related spending under “war-related expenditure” (Kriegsbedingten
Staatsaufwands), and hence in “military and defence expenditure” following the work of Thoma () with an
article entitled “Lastenausgleich” (see footnote  of page  for details). He also shows the funds on war-related
expenditure (including the Lastenausgleich) in Table  under the category Social Warfare (Soziale kriegsfolgelas-
ten). See also Strecke ().
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Next, we present the results of the differential effects (table ). Results suggest that each
category of social expenditure grew much more quickly after  relative to other categor-
ies. All coefﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant. Indeed, results are consistent with the idea
that the LDA loosened the public budget constraint allowing for greater social expenditure.
The largest increase is in health expenditure followed by roughly equal increases in educa-
tion and economic development. Housing expenditures also rise on a per capita basis, but
by half the amount of education and economic development. This might be because of the
Housing Act of  where the West German government provided publicly subsidized
housing and gave big tax breaks to builders (Diefendorf, Frohn and Rupieper ).
Overall our results are consistent with observations by Deutsche Bank (Report January
, ) that debt repayment under the LDA determined to a large extent the course of
public investment and expenditure in the German economy and as debts were repaid (or
cancelled) this freed up new resources to further public investment. Additionally, as we will
describe in the next section, repayments made a genuine contribution towards easing the
balance of payments, which allowed Germany to accumulate foreign reserves, lessening the
potential ﬁnancial constraints imposed by the balance of payments (Eichengreen and
Ritschl ).
We tested the robustness of this baseline differences regression in several ways. First, we
ran ﬁxed effects regression allowing for separate intercepts for each of the fourteen
Table . Differential effects using the spending categories of health, education, economic
development and housing as the treated group and other categories as the control group in
DM, population and inﬂation adjusted
Government spending category Pre-LDA Post-LDA DiD
Economic development , , ,
Non-social spending , , ()
Diff (T-C)  , .***
() () [.]
Education , , ,
Non-social spending , , ()
Diff (T-C) , , .***
() () [.]
Health , , ,
Non-social spending , , (,)
Diff (T-C) , , .***
(,) () [.]
Housing , , ,
Non-social spending , , ()
Diff (T-C)  , .**
() () [.]
Number of observations   
Source: Data are from Weitzel ().
Notes: The dependent variable is the level of real spending per capita. “All other spending categories” in the control
group include administration of justice, agriculture, church and culture, defence, ﬁnancial management, internal
administration, regional and community spending, public safety and order, trade and commerce, and war burdens.
Pre-LDA period is – and the post-LDA period is –. Means and Standard Errors are estimated
by linear regression. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. P-values are immediately below the standard errors
and robust t-statistics are in brackets, ***P < .; **P < .; *P < ..
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expenditure categories. Point estimates are exactly the same, but standard errors are signiﬁ-
cantly smaller. We then explored three speciﬁcations which aggregate all four social spend-
ing categories into one treatment group. We use the level of real spending per capita, the
logarithm of real spending per capita and the level of the expenditure share (ratio of cat-
egory expenditure to the total) as dependent variables. All speciﬁcations include ﬁxed
effects for each of the fourteen categories of spending and year ﬁxed effects. These results
are reported in table . All point estimates are positive and economically signiﬁcant.
Column  suggests the LDA was associated with higher social spending on the order of
. log points. The coefﬁcient in the speciﬁcation using the logarithm of spending is posi-
tive, but only marginally signiﬁcant (P-value = .). Column  of table  shows that the
share of social spending rose by roughly . percentage points relative to other categories
after .
Additionally, we estimated a “fully ﬂexible” model allowing for separate coefﬁcients on
the social spending category in each year of the sample (also including year dummies and
ﬁxed effects for the fourteen expenditure categories). Figure  shows the results graphically.
While social spending was not generally growing signiﬁcantly differently from other categor-
ies prior to , after , in each year, spending per capita is relatively higher. Most coef-
ﬁcients post- are signiﬁcantly different from zero and increasingly larger suggesting an
adjustment to a longer run equilibrium.
We also check whether our results are contingent upon the number of spending categor-
ies in the control group and whether the years immediately after the LDA produce the
Table . Differential effects regressions for social spending per capita, in DM
() () () () ()
Spending/
person
Spending/
person
Spending/
person
ln (spending/
person)
Expenditure
share
Social Spending ×
Post-LDA
, , , . .
(,) (,) (,) (.) (.)
.*** .*** .** . .**
[.] [.] [.] [.] [.]
N     
Bootstrapping SE No Yes No No No
Year ﬁxed effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Category ﬁxed effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Source: Data are from Weitzel ().
Notes: The dependent variable is the level of real social spending per capita in column (–), in column  we take
the natural logarithm of the level of real social spending per capita, and in column  the share in expenditure in
real social spending. For the variable social spending, we aggregate all four social spending categories (health, edu-
cation, economic development, and housing) into one treatment group. Other spending categories in the control
group include administration of justice, agriculture, church and culture, defence, ﬁnancial management, internal
administration, regional and community spending, public safety and order, trade and commerce, and war burdens.
Regressions are estimated by linear regression. Robust standard errors clustered on expenditure category are in
parentheses. To account for potential sample bias estimates in column , we bootstrapped standard errors in col-
umn . P-values are immediately below the robust standard errors. Robust t-statistics are in brackets, ***P < .;
**P < .; *P < ..
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same meaningful results as . First, in column  of table , bootstrapped standard errors
show the same overall results as our baseline speciﬁcation. In addition, a Jackknife estimator
also achieves similar quantitative results. We also replicate the results for table  with
bootstrap and Jackknife resampling methods in the standard errors, running  new regres-
sions each time leaving out one spending category in the control group. In all cases,
spending categories in the treatment group were statistically signiﬁcant. Second, for the
social spending budget, instead of making the post-treatment period begin in , as a
robustness check we also allow it start in , , and  so, respectively, the indicator
Post equals zero for the years up until , , and  and one otherwise. Using our
baseline speciﬁcation in table  (column ), if the post-treatment period begins in , the
P-value climbs sharply to . (instead of .), if the post-treatment period begins in
, the P-value is even higher . and for , the P-value rise so that the LDA treat-
ment effect becomes statistically insigniﬁcant (.).
In table , we also attempt to look at whether social expenditure in Germany grew faster
after the LDA relative to other European nations with a triple dummy variable interaction
term (column ). We use data on the share of spending in economic development originally
from Flora () and updated by Lindert (). Flora’s data provides information on
eight spending categories plus a residual. After using equation () and applying year and
category ﬁxed effects in column , we also try to explain variations in the share of central
Figure . Year speciﬁc estimates of real social expenditure per capita in real DM,
–.
Sources: Data are from Weitzel ().
Notes: The dependent variable is social spending per capita, see text. Coefﬁcients are
estimated by OLS. Regression includes ﬁxed effects for each spending category and year
indicators. Social expenditure includes four categories of spending: economic development,
health, education and housing.  percent conﬁdence bands based on robust standard
errors.
 The Jackknife deletes each observation and calculates an estimate based on the remaining n− of them, and uses
this collection of estimates to estimate the bias and the standard error.
 That is, ten regressions for each spending category in the control group for the four spending categories in the
treatment group.
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government expenditure in economic and social development across time (data are avail-
able from  to , with the years before  deﬁning the treatment period) and
between European countries (Austria, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and the UK).
We use central expenditure as it reports German data for the years  and  and
because government expenditure (including states and municipalities) was not available for
all countries. The main limitation of this analysis is that we are forced to rely on a cross-
country panel of social expenditure data across European nations that may not be fully con-
sistent. For instance, there may be substantial difﬁculties when identifying spending in
social security programs and social health insurance across countries (e.g., “for some coun-
tries/periods an inclusion of social insurance proved to be too difﬁcult” Flora (, )).
Therefore, we use data on economic development (economic services and spending in
transport and communication) and do not add other spending in social categories such as
spending in public health due to cross-sectional problems in the treatment group. Similarly,
we avoid including social spending on education or housing in the control group. In this
case, the control group of spending categories includes data on defence, police, security,
and debt. Despite important data limitations, results suggest that expenditure on economic
development in Germany, as compared with spending on debt repayment, defence, and
police, grew much more quickly after  relative to other spending categories and relative
to other European nations.
Importantly, to explore the extent to which the LDA changed the government’s budget
constraint compared to a counterfactual with no debt relief, we use the synthetic control
method to see by how much expenditure and revenue would have been in the absence of
debt relief. The “Synthetic control” method allows us to compare Germany to a weighted
set of matched comparison countries which did not receive debt relief in the same period
Table . Differential effects regressions for expenditure share in economic development
across European countries
() () ()
Expenditure share in economic development . . .
x Post-LDA (.) (.) (.)
.** .* .**
[.] [.] [.]
Number of observations   
Number of groups — — 
Year ﬁxed effects No Yes Yes
Category ﬁxed effects No Yes Yes
Country ﬁxed effects No No Yes
Notes and Sources: We use data on the share of spending in economic development originally from Flora () and
updated by Lindert (). The dependent variable is expenditure share in economic development. Other spending
categories in the control group include defence, police and security and debt. We did not include other social cat-
egories such as education or housing. The countries in the control group include Austria, France, Italy, the
Netherlands, and the UK. As in equation (), the post-treatment period begins in , so the indicator Post equals
zero for the years – and one otherwise. Central Government expenditure for Germany for the years 
and  interpolated from the General Government. Central government “debt interest” data for Germany in 
interpolated from general goverment spending for the same year. Given the missing data for different countries
“social security” (missing data for Austria, France, Italy, and the Netherlands), we did not include data on health
expenditure. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. P-values are immediately below the robust standard errors.
Robust t-statistics are in brackets, ***P < .; **P < .; *P < ..
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(a control group) that approximate the counterfactual and show how expenditure and rev-
enue would have evolved without the LDA. Using the new data from the Macrohistory
database (Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor ), this counterfactual “synthetic control” is
estimated using the values of predictors of the outcome (exports, GDP per capita, level of
population, and inﬂation) in comparison countries (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland,
France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the
UK, and the USA) between  and .
The matching algorithm of “synthetic control” selects comparison units by iteratively
assigning weights to each comparison country and then selecting the combination of coun-
tries and weights that minimises the distance between the value of predictors in the com-
bined synthetic control unit and their observed values in the treated country before the
intervention. This minimisation algorithm also creates a balance between the treated
country, Germany, and the synthetic control, by prioritising variables that have the greatest
predictive power on the outcome. The estimated effect of the LDA is then estimated by a
comparison of the observed post-treatment outcomes in the treated unit and the estimated
outcomes in the synthetic control (for the details of the method see Abadie, Diamond, and
Hainmueller ).
Figure  shows that the trend in expenditure and revenue was very similar in Germany
compared to the control before the LDA but, after the LDA, the two trends diverge:
expenditure and revenue accelerates in Germany, while in the control group estimated
expenditure and revenue were much lower than the real values. In , the difference
between Germany and “Synthetic Germany” in expenditure and revenue would have been
. percent and . percent, respectively, and in , . percent and . percent,
respectively. This gap shows how much expenditure and revenue there would have been in
post-WW Germany under the counterfactual of no debt relief.
The years after  witnessed not just increases on the expenditure side but, as the
recovery took off, from the revenue side as well so that the cumulative surpluses were of
much greater magnitude than prior to . In the winter of , The Economist also com-
mented on Schäffer’s tax cuts: “his cuts will have done a great deal to ensure that Dr.
Adenauer’s party… wins this year’s elections; and his reforms will have given fresh stimulus
to German industry” (The Economist;  February , ). Figure A of supplementary
material shows the yield of main Federal taxes and taxes of the states such as the wages tax,
assessed income tax, corporation tax, property tax, and turnover tax (adjusted for monthly
“seasonality” with year dummies). Revenue from all these taxes also started to increase
coinciding with the LDA in . As already argued by Eichengreen and Ritschl ()
and Piketty (), after  the yield of the main taxes was higher than previous years
allowing, in turn, the government to lower tax rates to further stimulate the economy. This
ﬁscal expansion potentially created a virtuous circle whereby the LDA generated some
faster growth, with a rise in the tax yield, which allowed the German government to lower
taxes with this higher yield creating further economic stimulus.
Finally, data from Rahlf () also show that capital ﬂows rose quickly after  as
Germany re-integrated into the international system and stabilised its ﬁnances. Germany’s
balance of payments and net international position likely also improved. Foreign deposits
 Indeed, this is a particularly well-suited method to account for aggregate shocks since although it builds upon
the setting of the standard difference-in-differences model, it makes two important changes to account for
shocks: it allows for time-varying individual-speciﬁc heterogeneity and takes a data driven approach to forming
counterfactuals through selecting the control group.
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Figure . Expenditure and revenues in Germany and synthetic Germany, –.
Sources: Data from Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor () and Flora ().
Notes: For expenditure (Panel A) - since the data from Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor.
() do not report revenues for pre- years, we extrapolated them using the data
from Flora (, ) as they move nearly exactly the same for post- years. The
treated unit is Germany and the control units are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland,
France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
the UK, and the USA. The predictor balance for exports is . (and for the synthetic
exports .), real GDP per capita (in purchasing power parity) ,. (synthetic
GDP is ,.), population level is ,. (and synthetic population is ,.)
and the consumer price index (CPI) is . (and synthetic CPI is ,). We used a
“nested” optimisation procedure that greatly improves pre-intervention RMSPE (Root
Mean Squared Prediction Error) and the predictor balance on variables, with an
RMSPE of .. For revenue (Panel B) - since the data from Jordà, Schularick, and
Taylor () do not report revenues for pre- years, we extrapolated them using the
data from Flora (, ) as they move nearly exactly the same for post- years.
The treated unit is Germany and the control units are Australia, Belgium, Canada,
France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
the UK, and the USA. The predictor balance for exports is . (and for the synthetic
exports .), real GDP per capita (in purchasing power parity) ,. (synthetic
GDP is ,.), population level is ,. (and synthetic population is ,.),
and the CPI is . (and synthetic CPI is .). We used a “nested” optimisation
procedure with an RMSPE of ..
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held by the German Central Bank declined by . percent between  and , but
subsequently increased by . percent between  and  (Table . Series x).
The compound annual growth rate between  and  for Central Bank foreign assets
was . percent (Table . Series x) and for the foreign assets of German banks was
. percent (Table . Series x). Not surprisingly, as Giersch, Paque, and Schmieding
(, ), and others argue, it was only after the London “agreement had come into force
as at mid-September , [that] West Germany swiftly began to lift the tight restrictions on
capital ﬂows”. Some historians also hypothesised that the LDA was a decisive mechanism for
reaching full employment in  (Kaiser ; Kaplan and Schleiminger ).
. Beneﬁt : reintegration of Germany into international markets, sustainability of
German ﬁnances and full convertibility of the DM
The LDA also played an important role for the improvement of the German ﬁnances,
which could be observed through the impact of the LDA in bringing about the full convert-
ibility of the DM within the Bretton Woods System. During the negotiations of the LDA
the convertibility of the DM was a key issue for German leaders, banks, and ﬁrms. When
the negotiations of the LDA were fragile, Abs wrote a letter to Adenauer saying that: “Dear
Chancellor, I received your letter and read it with interest. I can only remark that the
London Debt Agreement is not a hindrance to achieving the convertibility of the Deutsche
Mark, but the prerequisite” (seen in Glasemann , ).
Dernburg (, ) also opines that “Germany’s over-all position vis-a-vis the dollar
area in  and thereafter will be inﬂuenced not only by her dollar-import liberalization
move but also, and even to a larger extent, by the resumption of transfers on her large for-
eign debt under the London Debt Agreement”. Similarly, Dornbusch, Nolling, and Layard
(, ) comment that “The goal of full currency convertibility on the capital account could
have been reached much earlier than , though not before the London Debt Agreement
had been concluded” (italics in original) and Giersch, Paque, and Schmieding (, )
that “until the issue of Germany’s external indebtedness was ﬁnally resolved by the London
Debt Agreement in early , West Germany was de facto excluded from the international
capital market”. Piketty and Zucman (, ) noted that “the London debt agreement
also explains why there is a large net capital transfer recorded in ”.
The LDA was a necessary condition for the reintegration of Germany into the international
ﬁnancial markets and helped it to achieve convertibility of the Mark. Technically, while in
the early s the problem for reintegration of Germany into global markets was not so
much to raise funds for debt repayment in DM, but its ability to transfer these funds from
DM into hard currencies (US-Dollar), sufﬁcient US-Dollar reserves were needed with a sur-
plus in foreign exchange (Dernburg ). Thus, if the LDA led to the sustainability of
Germany’s ﬁnances, we should observe that just after the implementation of the LDA
Germany substantially increased its US-Dollar reserves; directly through trade with the USA
and indirectly within the European Payments Union (EPU) clearing mechanism.
 For instance, Kaiser (, ) argues that “the result of this debt-trade-link was a substantial contribution to
Germany reaching full employment very quickly, thanks to a strong export performance”.
 Glasemann (, ) further comments that the LDA was decisive for West Germany to “quickly gain trust and
creditworthiness abroad as a prerequisite for economic reconstruction. The convertibility of the Deutsche Mark
was faster than many had expected”.
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It is crucial to stress how the LDA shaped German ﬁnances looking at the changing rhet-
oric of the German ofﬁcials before and after the implementation of the LDA. For instance,
in the early months of the LDA, sufﬁcient US-Dollar reserves were an initial concern raised
by German ofﬁcials, though they also argued that this situation was attributable to the suc-
cessful implementation of the LDA. The Report of July  (p.) stressed that “in the
further course of the second half of the year, however, it is likely that the German balance-
of-payment surpluses will appreciably diminish, not only in relation to the E.P.U. area, but
also to the other currency areas, and in particular the dollar area … [However,] the
German government intends, once the London Agreement has come into force, to make a
start with the transfer to other countries”. Similarly, the Report of September  (p.)
discusses that “it therefore remains to be seen how the dollar balance of payments will
move during the next few months if the seasonal factors become less favourable, and if, as
is possible, larger transfers have to be effected as the result of the London debt
agreements”.
Nevertheless, in subsequent months this concern was fully removed. The Report of
January  (p. ) comments that “The progressive improvement of the balance of pay-
ments position has made it possible for the German Federal Republic by degrees to
remove, in many individual ﬁelds, the exchange restrictions which still applied, and
thereby to approach appreciably nearer to the goal of DM convertibility. As the principal
aspect of this process, once the required condition had been created through the coming
into force of the London Debts Agreement on  September,  relaxations of transfer
have been increasingly extended to cover income on capital, as well as payments in con-
nection with capital claims in general” (see also the Annual report of ). In ﬁgure ,
we show the expansion of German bilateral trade (as measured by the German exports)
after August  in the EPU countries, Sterling countries and the USA or Canada.
Although the LDA was already signed by February , ratiﬁcation by the German gov-
ernment only arrived in August . Here, Abs commented that when the LDA was
launched, “the terms of payment in foreign trade changed [and] there was a growing will-
ingness from foreign countries to grant trade credits for foreign trade” (Abs , ). It
is relatively clear that trade expanded more quickly with dollar-based entities, thus boost-
ing Germany’s ability to re-pay remaining claims as per the LDA. Interestingly, using the
data from the monthly reports of the Deutsche Bundesbank, we can also compare trade in
Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa with local currency and with dollars. In all the
cases, trade with dollars accelerated after August  while trade in local currencies
declined or remained constant.
Similar to equation (), in table  we run a DiD model with German bilateral trade data
for different countries and currency unions, using monthly data on exports from the
monthly reports of the Deutsche Bundesbank from September  to December .
In the models, we use year and category ﬁxed effects and monthly dummies to deal with
“seasonality” of the monthly trade statistics. Since we want to look at policies aimed at
earning more dollars (rather than just which countries are growing faster) we also control
for country demand with a dummy variables for the interaction of country and month
 We start our analysis in September  because this is the ﬁrst month that trade statistics at the monthly level
and for different currency areas start to be consistently recorded in the reports of the Deutsche Bundesbank. We
tested the robustness of the models to alternative baselines, variously selecting different time points between
September  and July  and ending between August  and December , and found none of the
main results differed.
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indicators. In the treatment group, we use the trade areas of EPU countries, Dollar coun-
tries and Sterling countries and in the control group Latin American countries, Eastern
European countries (outside the EPU system) along with African and Asian countries. The
indicator for pre-LDA runs from September  to August  and the post-LDA from
September  until December . Clearly, along with the rapid expansion of exports
described in the monthly reports of the Deutsche Bundesbank and elsewhere (De Long and
Eichengreen ; Bordo a), we consistently see that trade with foreign countries
increased more rapidly just after August  with respect to countries that would increase
Germany’s US-$ reserves. This is particularly true for the EPU countries with the clearing
mechanism and directly with dollar countries (mainly the USA).
Regarding the role of the LDA in stabilising the German ﬁnances, it is particularly interest-
ing to follow the discussion made by Eichengreen and Ritschl (, –) comparing
the causes and mechanisms of the recovery of Britain and Germany after WW. With regard
to the mechanisms of recovery, they distinguish the important role of the LDA for the stabil-
ization of the German ﬁnances: “private savings rates were actually quite similar in the two
countries. Moreover, in both countries public sector’s contribution to national saving was
positive. Both countries were capital exporters. The question therefore is how two such similar
patterns could have produced such different outcomes. The answer is less different post-war
Figure . “De-Seasonalized” German bilateral trade with main currency areas,
September –December .
Sources: Data from Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor ().
Notes: Monetary units in millions of DM. The vertical line indicates the month of
August .
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policies than different ﬁnancial inheritances—speciﬁcally, very different debt/income ratios …
Different levels of debt meant different balance-of-payments positions, given similar savings
rates. The British balance of payments was weak owing to the large amount of service due on
debt to foreigners, while the German balance of payments beneﬁted from the country’s debts
having been written down by the currency reform of  and the London Agreement of
”. Important for our argument, they continue by saying that “thus, the main difference
lay in postwar debt arrangements which favored Germany, allowing her to accumulate foreign
currency reserves despite savings rates only marginally different from Britain’s. And that accu-
mulation of reserves freed macroeconomic policy from the constraint imposed by the balance
of payments… In Germany, where pressing foreign exchange constraints were absent, one
might expect more stable ﬁscal policy”.
Table . Differential effects using German bilateral trade with EPU countries, Dollar
countries and Steerling countries as the treated group and other countries as the control
group
Currency trade areas Pre-LDA Post-LDA DiD
EPU countries ,. ,. .
Non-EPU, Sterling & Dollar countries . . (.)
Diff (T-C) . ,. .***
(.) (.) [.]
Dollar countries . . .
Non-EPU, Sterling & Dollar countries . . (.)
Diff (T-C) . . .***
(.) (.) [.]
Sterling countries . . .
Non-EPU, Sterling & Dollar countries . . (.)
Diff (T-C) . . .***
(.) (.) [.]
Number of observations   
Seasonal adjustment — — Yes
Country demand adjustment — — Yes
Year ﬁxed effects — — Yes
Category ﬁxed effects — — Yes
Source: Data collected from the monthly reports of the Deutsche Bundesbank (several issues) and data originally
from the German Federal Statistical Ofﬁce.
Notes: The dependent variable is the bilateral trade with any of the following currency unions: EPU countries,
Dollar countries and Sterling countries. “All other countries” in the control group include a group for Latin
American countries, another for Eastern European countries (and European countries outside the EPU system),
African countries and Asian countries. We use monthly data and the pre-LDA period is from September  to
August , and the post-LDA period is September –December . In the equations, we eliminate season-
ality for German exports with monthly time dummies. The results without ﬁxed effects and for subsamples are also
statistically signiﬁcant at the  percent level. Additional information regarding the data reported in the monthly
reports of the Deutsche Bundesbank are the following: The Figures of Germany include West Berlin. The
ﬁgures show total exports to consumer countries. Data for EPU countries include overseas territories as appropri-
ate, data for the UK include data from members and non-members of the OEEC and in such case, these EPU
countries (non-member countries which, according to the list of OEEC countries, do not belong to the Sterling
area) account in pounds sterling. Means and standard errors are estimated by linear regression. Robust standard
errors clustered on currency trade areas are in parentheses. P-values are immediately below the standard errors and
robust t-statistics are in brackets, ***P < .; **P < .; *P < ..
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. Beneﬁt : stabilising inﬂation
A ﬁnal major economic beneﬁt was to stabilise inﬂation. Bordo (a, ) explains that
“Relatively rapid growth (especially of exports) and relatively slow underlying inﬂation pro-
duced a series of current account surpluses and reserve inﬂows throughout the s”
Similarly, Lindlar and Holtfrerich (:) discuss that “a lower rate of inﬂation than
abroad and a surplus on the current account have been among the most important macro-
economic goals in Germany”. While Germany started to reduce its inﬂation after WW
through monetary reform, the debt relief and the restoration of the ﬁnancial stability was
accompanied by stable inﬂation fuelling trade (De Long and Eichengreen ).
A comparison using the CPI data from Mitchell () between Germany and other
European economies in ﬁgure , shows that post- price stabilization only occurred
largely in Germany as the growth rate of a CPI in Germany was among the lowest in
European economies (before  inﬂation in Germany was among the highest in Europe),
and well until the s inﬂation in Germany grew at much lower rates than in other mod-
ern economies. This did not happen in the pre- years and it has also been already dis-
cussed by historians: “the rate of inﬂation in Germany, measured by the consumer price
index or the GDP deﬂator, was lower than in a number of competitor countries” (Lindlar
and Holtfrerich , ). Obviously the roots and causes of German policy towards inﬂa-
tion are much more complex, however, it is likely that debt relief provided a boost for the
goal of stable inﬂation.
There was a strong desire from the Allied powers to link repayment with Germany’s abil-
ity to grow, to lessen any inﬂation process where Germany could cover its debt without
upsetting its current balance of payments, in which “the export surpluses became the main
motor of non-inﬂationary economic growth” (Frowen and Karakitsos , ). Indeed,
Germany’s transfer capacity linked to low inﬂation was one of the worries of the design of
the LDA during the early discussion. In July , the Three Power Commission drafted a
document on The Question of Germany’s Capacity to Pay for the London Preliminary
Conference. They prudently observed that “Germany’s ability to pay depends not only on
the ability of private and governmental debtors to raise the necessary amounts in DM
Figure . Consumer price inﬂation in Germany, –.
Sources: German consumer price inﬂation from  to  (left ﬁgure) from Piketty
and Zucman (, Table DEa) and CPI data ( = ) (right ﬁgure) from
Mitchell (), Table H.
Notes: The right ﬁgure includes data from the following countries: Austria, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the UK (in
light grey).
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without inﬂationary consequences, but also on the ability of the national economy to cover
the debts out of the current trade surplus” (seen in Kaiser ). This was part of the LDA
design, as lower inﬂation gave German exports a more favourable market position than that
held by many of their competitors.
In table  we also run a DiD model with the natural logarithm of the CPI across western
countries between  and . Results suggest, not surprisingly, that the log of the CPI
grew much more slowly after  relative to other countries. All coefﬁcients are negative
and statistically signiﬁcant showing lower inﬂation rates in Germany. Indeed, results are
consistent with a bootstrapping of the standard errors, year and country ﬁxed effects, and a
subsample strategy of European countries (removing non-European countries such as the
USA or Canada).
In principle, it is also possible that the stabilisation of inﬂation in  rather than in
 or before was due to the outbreak of the Korean War (–), and under the
counterfactual of no war, stabilization would have occurred three years before the LDA and
not in . However, the impact of the Korean War on German ﬁnances has been highly
debated. Temin and others argue that in the USA “The Korean War inﬂation was mild
because price controls were instituted and because the demand stimulus was small” and in
Germany “any stimulus from an exogenous rise in the demand for German exports at the
start of the Korean War was both tiny and short-lived” (Temin , –).
. Discussion
The LDA, designed over  years ago by the Allied forces and market participants together
with Germany, eliminated roughly half of the principal of accumulated German pre-war
Table . Differential effects regressions for the natural logarithm of CPI across
Western countries, –
() () () ()
CPI x Post-LDA −. −. −. −.
(.) (.) . .
.*** .*** .*** .***
[−.] [.] [−.] [−.]
Number of observations    
All countries Yes Yes Yes No
European countries No No No Yes
Bootstrapping SE No Yes No No
Year ﬁxed effects No No Yes Yes
Country ﬁxed effects No No Yes Yes
Source: Data are from Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor ().
Notes: Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the consumer price index (CPI). We use data from  to
 for the following countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the USA. In the European sample,
we excluded Australia, Canada, Japan, and the USA. We use the log of the CPI data instead of the log of the inﬂa-
tion rate to account for negative values. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses.
To account for potential sample bias estimates in column , we bootstrapped standard errors in column . P-values
are immediately below the robust standard errors. Robust t-statistics are in brackets, ***P < .; **P < .;
*P < ..
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and post-war debt. This plan, the LDA, formed a sort of sequel to a broad range of mea-
sures for European and German economic recovery, ﬁrst formally articulated in the
Marshall Plan, which recognised the need for a satisfactory arrangement on German debt
due to its poor history of debt repayment. Ritschl () also considers that “the ﬁnancial
core of the Marshall Plan was something much bigger, an enormous sovereign debt relief
programme” that “perpetuated these arrangements, and thus waterproofed them for the
days when Marshall Aid would be repaid and the European Payments Union would be
dissolved”.
Our analysis provides evidence consistent with the idea that the LDA contributed to
accelerating economic growth, by freeing resources for domestic investment and stabilising
German ﬁnances. The LDA helped pave the way for the “Wirtschaftwunder” or “The
Miracle on the Rhine”.
This analysis has several limitations. While we can account for the proximate ﬁscal trans-
formation that accompanied the LDA, it is more difﬁcult to precisely quantify the impact
on overall economic growth. The German economy was already growing between  and
 at a historically remarkable annual growth rate of  percent. It is difﬁcult to envisage
whether the conditions for restructuring debts would have been the same without initial
signs of recovery from Germany. Indeed, since debt restructuring was tied to the Marshall
Plan and formed part of a broad range of measures for European recovery, it is difﬁcult to
see the success of the LDA without the preconditions that created the currency reform of
 and the creation of the European Payments Union.
For understanding policy making, the LDA may have implications for contemporary
management of debt. In , the Greek Prime Minister, Alexis Tsipras, called for similar
relief of Greek debt, receiving much media attention. However, arguably, the historical ana-
logy has at least two major political-economy differences. One is that Germany’s debt crisis
arose in the context of two massively destructive World Wars, with – million military
and civilian casualties and devastated infrastructure. Germany also represented . percent
of the Western European population in  compared with indebted nations such as
Greece today, with . percent. Moreover, Germany was an important ally in the Cold War
and the American-led ﬁght against the expansion of the Soviet Union.
Nevertheless, what the LDA shows is that debt relief can help stimulate growth and pro-
vide the foundations for more equitable ﬁscal outcomes. In fact creditors received a sub-
stantial amount of their money back by linking the repayment of rescheduled debts to
Germany’s ability to grow. The debt restructuring proved to be a success and while there
had been a problem of debt just prior to , a decade later there was none. Moreover, it
is not the mere relief applied to the German ﬁnances that demands our attention, but the
philosophy of the agreement, namely, “to make a contribution to the development of a
prosperous community of nations” (The agreement on German external debts , B).
The conditions imposed by creditor countries in recent years, with harsher conditions
and through giving new loans, could not be more different. Today, countries that borrowed
money from the IMF had signiﬁcantly harsher conditions for repayment. While in the LDA
debt repayments were limited to  percent of the value of annual exports, in  the IMF
deﬁned repayment/export ratios as “sustainable ones” at much higher rates, above  per-
cent– percent in the Caribbean (. percent in St. Vincent and the Grenadines, .
percent in Grenada and . percent in Jamaica) and Latin America (. percent Brazil,
. percent Costa Rica and . percent El Salvador). Even higher debt burdens are
observed in Eastern Europe, in Ukraine (. percent), Montenegro (. percent), and
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Armenia (. percent), while in African countries illustrative ﬁgures are: . percent
Morocco and . percent Burundi.
Finally, in assessing post-war German debt relief, we must disentangle the political moti-
vations (in particular, those pertaining to foreign policy) from the goals. Even if we were to
ascribe the most cynical and instrumental motivations to the LDA of  (namely, the
need for a strong Germany in the context of the Cold War of the s, in addition to the
realisation of the errors of the Versailles Peace Conference and their subsequent effects), it
is clear that this debt relief was emphatically designed to help Germany grow and always
prioritised German economic health over the repayment of the debt. This involved signiﬁ-
cant sacriﬁces by creditors (in the form of renouncing a signiﬁcant part of their debt), but
also the implementation of mechanisms to avoid any risk of causing the German economy
to stagnate with the burden of debt repayments. It is in this respect that the contrast is most
striking with the recent and current policies in relation to the Southern Eurozone countries.
We might readily accept that the foreign policy motivations of Germany and other
European countries in the late s and early s are very different from those of the
USA and its allies in the s, but the fact remains that the programme designed to restore
the ﬁnances of heavily indebted Eurozone countries had a conspicuously different goal, one
that prioritised the repayment of the debt and economic reform (by way of austerity mea-
sures) over the rehabilitation of the affected economies via signiﬁcant reductions in debt.
By revisiting the  LDA and its subsequent effects, we can see a much clearer image of
the impact of policies (including their motivations and objectives) that were developed to
manage the ﬁnancial crisis in the Eurozone.
Supplementary material
Supplementary material is available at European Review of Economic History online.
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